This paper uses exogenous variation in electoral rules to test the predictions of strategic voting models and the causal validity of Duverger's Law. Estimations based on a regression discontinuity design in the assignment of single-ballot and dual-ballot (runoff) electoral systems in Brazilian mayoral races indicate that, in accordance to Duverger's Law, single-ballot plurality rule causes voters to desert third placed candidates and vote for the two most popular ones. I find that the effects are stronger in close elections, and that candidates' characteristics and entry cannot account for the results, suggesting that strategic voting is the driving force behind these findings.
Introduction
Economists and political scientists have long been interested in the question of whether citizens vote "sincerely" or "strategically." How voting decisions take place is not only fundamental to the understanding of the democratic process, but also has important implications on how theory is made. Virtually any economic model with voting for three or more candidates requires the assumption that voters act either sincerely or strategically and this choice usually has important implications for the model's results and conclusions.
1
The best-known prediction regarding strategic voting in a multi-candidate setting is Duverger's Law, named after Duverger's (1954) prediction that "simple-majority single-ballot [plurality rule or first-past-the-post] favors the two party system" while "simple majority with a second ballot [dual-ballot, described below] or proportional representation favors multipartyism."
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In this paper I empirically test Duverger's Law, addressing the validity of its causal statement by exploring a regression discontinuity design in the assignment of electoral rules in Brazilian municipal elections. I also investigate the mechanisms driving the association between plurality and two-party dominance, providing evidence that strategic voting is driving the results.
Duverger's rationale was that plurality rule creates an incentive for voters to engage in a particular pattern of strategic voting, which is best described by an example. A citizen believes that candidates 1 and 2 have the highest probability of winning an election (and that a tie between 1 and 2 is more likely than a tie between any other two candidates). His most preferred choice, however, is candidate 3. To maximize his chances of being the pivotal voter, this citizen strategically chooses to vote for his preferred choice between 1 and 2. As all voters go through a similar logic, candidate 3 is deserted by her supporters, which all vote for candidates 1 and 2. 3 Duverger also argued that this rallying behind only two "serious" candidates would not 1 A compelling example is the citizen-candidate models of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) . The structure of the two independently developed models is similar, but the latter assumes strategic voting while the former assumes sincere voting, which results in different equilibrium policies.
2 Riker (1982) describes Duverger's predictions as "a true sociological law ". 3 In this paper, all voters are male and all candidates female.
occur under dual-ballot plurality (also known as "runoff"), a system where voters may vote twice. First, an election is held and if a candidate obtains more than 50% of the votes, she is elected. If not, then a second round of elections is held where only the two most voted candidates in the first round face off.
4
Duverger's argument has been established in formal game-theoretic models of voting and generalized to the "m+1 rule" (Cox, 1997; Myerson, 1999) : in an election for m seats, m+1
candidates should obtain all the votes. In a single-ballot plurality rule election, m equals one and only two candidates receive a positive number of votes, while in (the first round of) a dual-ballot election m equals two and the vote share of the third-placed candidate is positive. Hence, an exogenous change from single to dual-ballot emulates the theoretical exercise of a ceteris paribus change in m and allows a test of the m+1 rule.
5
Such exogenous variation is generated by the Brazilian Constitution, which mandates that municipalities with less than 200 000 registered voters use single-ballot plurality rule to elect their mayors. This regression discontinuity design generates assignment of electoral rules that is "as good as random" and allows causal inference of its effects. Intuitively, municipalities "just below" the threshold should be, on average, similar in all observed and unobserved characteristics to those "just above" it, so that any difference in outcomes between these two groups must be caused by the different electoral rules.
Using detailed data on the outcomes of the universe of mayoral elections in Brazil for the 1996-2004 period, I find evidence that, as predicted by Duverger's Law, a change from single ballot to dual ballot increases voting for the third and lower placed candidates, and it also decreases the vote margins between second and third (and also first and third) placed candidates, while not affecting the the margin between first and second placed candidates.
Both these results of are stronger in closely contested races where the incentives to vote strategically are larger. This combination of results, coupled with the fact that they cannot be explained neither by the number of candidates that enter a race nor a measure of their quality (education) make a case that strategic voting takes place in this context.
4 Dual-ballot is the most used electoral system for presidential elections in the world, and is common in primaries in the Southern United States and several large American cities, as well as regional elections in France, Italy and Switzerland. In some cases, the threshold for first-round victory differs from 50%.
5 Section 2 briefly discusses this theoretical literature.
The results in this paper communicate with a large number of theoretical analyses of strategic voter coordination, which are discussed briefly in Section 2. Of particular interest are Martinelli's (2002) and Bouton's (2010) models of strategic voting in dual ballot elections, with the latter finding that two kinds of equilibria, one where third placed candidates are deserted or another where they are not, can be observed in both single or dual ballot. This ambiguous prediction emphasizes the need for empirical evidence on the subject.
A previous empirical literature compares single and dual ballot elections to test Duverger's Law, with mixed results: Wright and Riker (1989) and Golder (2006) find support for it, while Shugart and Taagepera (1994) and Engstrom and Engstrom (2008) do not.
Differently from my analysis, the endogeneity of electoral rules is an obstacle to the causal interpretation of the results in these papers. This is particular important since political scientists have suggested "a causality following in the reverse direction, from the number of parties towards electoral rules" (Taagepera, 2003) .
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A notable exception is Bordignon et al. (2010) , a paper written independently from this one that explores a similar regression discontinuity design in Italian municipalities.
Their findings are that dual ballot leads to larger number of candidates and smaller policy variability than single ballots, conforming to the predictions of an analytical model of party formation. Differently from this paper, the effects on voter behavior are not analyzed.
7
This paper is also related to the literature measuring the extent of strategic voting, which includes small-scale laboratory experiments (surveyed in Rietz, 2008) and analysis of surveys that directly ask respondents about their preferences and votes (e.g., Alvarez and Nagler, 2000) . 8 While the former approach requires dealing with the difficulties in how to elicit preferences and the measurement issues related to survey questions about previous voting behavior (Wright, 1990 (Wright, , 1992 Mullainathan and Washington, 2009 ), the 6 The argument is that societies with a predisposition to the existence of multiple parties will likely select an electoral system that is capable of fitting them in the political arena.
7 Short after the preparation of the original draft of this manuscript, I became aware of an independently developed paper (Chamon et al., 2009 ) that explores the same regression discontinuity design, but focuses mainly on the effect of electoral rules on fiscal spending. Another independently developed paper (Gonçalves et al., 2008) explores if dual-ballots increase the number of candidates that enter Brazilian mayoral races, using a difference-in-differences approach instead of the regression discontinuity design.
8 Also, Kawai and Watanabe (2010) estimate a structural model of voting using aggregate vote shares. Degan and Merlo (2009) analyse a different kind of strategic voting ("split tickets").
latter approach leaves open the question whether strategic voting occurs in elections with electorates thousands of times larger than the ones used in experiments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework, demonstrating how an exogenous change in electoral rules can be used to test the predictions of strategic voting models. Section 3 provides the context, data and empirical strategy, while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Theoretical Framework
The strategic voting rationale behind Duverger's Law is formalized in game-theoretic models by Palfrey (1989) , Myerson and Weber (1993) , Cox (1994) and Myerson (2002) . The overview of these models provided here is brief and the reader is referred to the surveys by Cox (1997) and Myerson (1999) for both the formal analysis and a detailed discussion of which key assumptions drive the results. A population of rational voters have (strict) preferences over a fixed number candidates and care only about which candidate is eventually elected (i.e., instrumental voting instead of expressive voting). A voter does not know exactly what are the preferences of his peers, but has a belief of its distribution in the population. Additionally, each voter has an expectation of how many votes each candidate will receive.
If expectations are rational with respect to beliefs 9 and all voters share the same beliefs and expectations (i.e., common priors and publicly formed expectations), then with a large enough electorate (such that the expectations are actually a precise prediction of equilibrium behavior) there will be two classes of equilibria. The first, usually referred as Duvergerian, has the third-placed candidate receiving zero votes, while the second, non-Duvergerian class has the third place candidate receiving the exact same amount of votes as the second placed candidate. This occurs because expectations are self-fulfilling: if two candidates are expected to finish in first and second place, they not only will but also receive all the votes. But if expectations are such that a tie is expected between the second and third (and even forth, fifth), then the tie will be observed in equilibrium, since the expectation does not tell the 9 The expectations are rational with respect to beliefs if an electorate whose preferences were in fact distributed according to the belief and voting optimally given the expectations would actually produce vote shares in accordance with the expectations. voters who they should "coordinate on". Cox (1994 Cox ( , 1997 extends the models to the case of dual-ballot plurality rule (DB, henceforth) and shows that, in the first round of elections, there are either Duvergerian equlibria with the three most voted candidates concentrating all the votes or non-Duvergerian equilibria where the third and fourth placed candidates tie. Moreover, this class of models is generalized to the "m+1 " rule (Myerson, 1999) : in an election for m seats, there exists an equilibrium where only m+1 candidates obtain all the votes.
Leaving the non-Duvergerian equilibrium aside for the moment, what the m+1 rule imply for the context of SB and DB is that under the former, a third placed candidate will receive zero votes, while in the first round of the latter the third placed candidate will receive a positive amount of votes.
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Under SB, m is equal to one, while in the first round of DB, m is equal to two (as a "seat" is then the right to be on the second ballot). Hence, a comparison between SB and DB is much like a "comparative static" of a change in m. Moreover, this comparative static generates predictions that are falsifiable, in the sense that they can be tested against data.
The quasi-random assignment of SB and DB to otherwise similar municipalities generated by the regression discontinuity design guarantees that the data satisfy the ceteris paribus condition of comparative statics. In other words, the isolated variation in electoral rules is an increase in m that is not accompanied, on average, by a change in any other variable.
In light of the discussion above, three particular predictions can be drawn from these theories:
1. The vote share received by the third and lower placed candidates is lower under SB than in the first round of DB.
2. The difference (or ratio) between the vote share of the third placed candidate and the second (or first) placed one is lower under SB than in the first round of DB.
3. The results in (1) and (2) should be particularly salient in elections where a candidate 10 In an actual SB election the third and lower placed candidates do not receive zero votes, but this evidence is not informative of whether models of Duvergerian strategic voting capture or not a particular feature that exist in the real world. Myatt (2007) uses a "global games" approach to develop a model of single-ballot plurality rule where there is a unique equilibrium where the third placed does suffer from strategic desertion but still receives a positive amount of votes.
wins by a small margin, while in elections where the winner obtains a vast majority the incentives to vote strategically are diminished.
The first prediction is just a re-statement of Duverger's Law. The second and third are more subtle predictions of strategic voting. Prediction (2) captures the feature that under SB strategic voting leads to a desertion of the eventually third placed candidate to the benefit of the first and second placed candidates, while under DB the same incentive is not present.
The third prediction comes from the fact that in elections which one candidate is expected to win for sure, there is no incentive to vote strategically. In the formal models, this phenomenon is represented by the equilibria where expectations are such that the probability of a tie between the first-placed candidate and any other candidate is exactly zero and hence, the (expected) probability of a voter being pivotal is zero no matter who he votes for.
Notice that the predictions only relate how voting under SB compare to voting under the first ballot of DB. Hence, any reference to voting under DB in this paper should be understood as voting in the first round of DB.
In Sections 3 and 4, the three predictions listed above are tested using the quasi-random assignment of SB and DB in Brazilian municipal races. In other words, models of strategic voting are tested by checking if the data agrees with its comparative static predictions.
Empirical Strategy

Background and Data
Brazil is constituted by more than 5,000 municipalities, which are the smallest entities of the federation -similarly to a town or city in the United States. Each municipality has its own government, comprised of a single mayor (Prefeito) and a municipal legislature (Câmara de Vereadores), which are elected every four years. The municipal elections are regulated by the federal government, and all municipalities have their elections and change their governments on the same date. Municipalities are not divided into separate districts, so that elections are "at-large".
Brazilian legislation requires all Brazilian citizens aged 18-70 to register to vote in the municipality they reside. Moreover, the 1988 Constitution stated that mayoral elections should be run under the single-ballot plurality rule system (SB) in municipalities with less than 200 000 voters (as of the end of registration period five months prior to election day).
SB is the first-past-the-post system used in the United States and United Kingdom: the most voted candidate in the election is awarded with the seat. Municipalities with 200 000 voters or more must have their elections under dual-ballot plurality rule (DB).
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The data on electoral outcomes used in this paper were collected by the federal elections authority (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral ), a branch of the federal judiciary power that oversees and regulates the electoral process. Moreover, it is practically impossible to credibly define policy positions of candidates in mayoral elections. First, there is a large number of parties in activity in Brazil. There are 29 parties that were able to elect at least one mayor in the period analyzed. Even in the sample of 121 elections with more than 150 000 and less than 250 000 voters there are 13
parties that successfully elected a mayor.
Although it would be possible to place these parties in some unidimensional spectrum when it comes to their policy choices at the national level, there would be no guarantee that the same positions would be valid at the local level, especially when one takes into account the size of the Brazilian territory and its large geographical differences. Moreover, evidence
11 The difference between the two systems is outlined in Subsection 2.1. 12 Data for previous elections where not available. However, there is good reason not to use data that is closer to the date where the rule was established (1988) . Several checks for internal consistency (e.g., vote shares equal to one, turnout is lower than registration, etc.) were made without any inconsistency being found.
from the United States show that parties can have different positions at the national level but implement the same policies at the local level (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2010) .
The first noteworthy result from the data is that there is full compliance with the assignment rule: no municipality with less than 200 000 voters had a second ballot and all municipalities with more than 200 000 voters where no candidate obtained more than 50% of the votes in the first round of election had a second round of election. Hence, the regression discontinuity design is "sharp".
Multi-candidate elections seem to be the norm: 95% of the elections with more than 125 000 voters and less than 275 000 voters have at least three candidates receiving a positive number of votes (and 78% of them have four or more candidates). Throughout the paper, all estimations are carried out using only the sample of elections that had three or more candidates. 
Identification Strategy
This subsection discusses the empirical strategy and its possible threats to validity. Focus is given to an intuitive description, leaving the formal aspects to Subsection 3.3.
In order to obtain causal estimates of Duverger's Law and successfully emulate the comparative statics of strategic voting models in the data, we need the assignment of SB and DB to be "as good as random".
Intuitively, this is expected to occur because the municipalities falling "just below" and "just above" the threshold should be, on average, ex ante similar to each other in every possible aspect. The reason that they are on a particular side of the threshold is due to random uncontrollable events that are not related to how people vote in any way.
Hence, any variable, observed or unobserved, that could affect voting independently of the electoral rule should be the same in the SB and DB municipalities that are sufficiently close to the threshold. This guarantees that any difference in outcomes between these two groups of cities is, in fact, a causal consequence of the different electoral rules.
For this to hold, it is important that the 200 000-voter threshold is somewhat arbitrary and not used to assign anything else to municipalities. To the best of my knowledge, this is the case. Although some other regulations of municipal governments depend on its population (which is different from its number of voters), none of them seem to have a threshold close to 200 000.
The cutoff was established by the federal congress when a new Constitution was written in 1988 and the reason for it seems to be that, although dual-ballot was deemed superior to SB, the cost of a possible second round of elections in the universe of municipalities was prohibitive. Moreover, even if Congress was aiming to keep a particular group of cities with or without DB when choosing the value of the threshold, by 1996 (when the first election in the sample was held) the different rates of population and registration growth between cities would have dissipated any effect.
Another threat to validity would occur if a change from SB to DB affected the decision to vote or not as well as the decision on who to vote for. If different groups of voters attend the polls under the different electoral rules, then the research design may not be able to successfully emulate the comparative statics of strategic voting models. In other words, the "just below" and "just above" groups would not have similar voters.
Fortunately (for the paper's research design), Brazilian law makes registration and voting compulsory for all citizens aged 18-70.
14 Failing to register or vote in a previous election renders a citizen ineligible to virtually all public provided services, 15 until a fine is paid.
Moreover, elections are held on a Sunday and a voters are allocated to polls close to their residence in order to foster turnout. Although these features do not guarantee a turnout close to 100% in the elections, 16 it makes the issues related to election outcomes (e.g., how
close the race is) second-order in the decision to vote or not and hence the difference in turnout under SB and DB is virtually zero, as is the difference between turnout in the first and second round of DB municipalities.
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14 Voting is voluntary for citizens aged 16-17 or 70+ and to those who are officially illiterate. 15 This includes attending public schools, receiving payments from social programs, obtaining government sponsored credit, working for the public sector and renewing several documents (passports, driver licences, social security cards, etc.) that are necessary to the everyday activity of citizens.
16 Figure 2 and Table 1 show that turnout is in the order of 85% of registered voters. This occurs because citizens who are not in their city of residence on election day can be waived from the punishment by attending a poll in any other municipality and submitting a "waiver form".
17 In the full sample, there are 92 elections that experienced a second round. A regression of the turnout Another serious issue is the possibility of strategic manipulation of the forcing variable.
If, for any reason, some agent (such as a party or the government) had a preference for SB or DB, it could try to manipulate the registration of voters in order to fall on the preferred side of the threshold. 18 This kind of behavior would likely invalidate the analysis, since some amount of "self-selection" would occur between SB and DB rules. However, if strategic registration does indeed take place, it would likely be reflected in a discontinuity in registration rates or in the number of cities that are above or below the threshold. Both of these features can be tested (and rejected) in the data.
Finally, one should not just accept that a regression discontinuity design generates quasirandom assignment. Just like in randomized controlled experiments it is usual to test for the possible failure to randomize by comparing predetermined variables on treatment and control groups. In this context it is important to look for a treatment effect in outcomes that were determined before the assignment of electoral rules, where it should not exist.
Estimation Framework
Let v be the number of registered voters in a municipality. The treatment effect of moving from single-ballot to dual-ballot can on outcome y can be estimated by:
Under the assumption that the conditional expectation of y on v is continuous, the first term on the right hand side converges to the expected outcome of a municipality with 200 000 voters and DB, while the second term converges to the expected outcome of a municipality with 200 000 voters and SB. Hence, TE identifies the treatment effect of changing from SB to DB for a municipality of 200 000 voters, as long as the distribution of treatment effects is continuous at threshold.
The estimation method used here closely follows the guidelines in Imbens and Lemieux (2008) , which in turn rely on the results provided by Hahn et al. (2001) . The reader is referred to these papers since only a brief overview is provided here. The limits on the right rate in the second round against the turnout rate in the first round (without a constant) yields an estimated parameter of 0.97 (clustered standard error = 0.002) and a R2 of 0.99. This implies that the turnout rates are virtually the same in the first and second round 18 Voters could prefer to register in SB municipalities in order to avoid having to attend the polls twice.
hand side are estimated non-parametrically using local linear regression. This consists of estimating a linear regression 19 of y on v using only data on where v ∈ [200 000 − h; 200 000].
The predicted value at v = 200, 000 is thus an estimate of the limit of y as v ↑ 200, 000.
Similarly, a regression using only data satisfying v ∈ [200 000; 200 000+h] is used to estimate the limit of y when v ↓ 200 000. The difference between these two estimated limits is the treatment effect. It is important to notice the non-parametric nature of the estimation:
although linear regressions are used, the assumption that the relationship between y and v is linear is not required. The limit approaching one side of the threshold is estimated using only data on that particular side.
The local linear regression estimate can be implemented in a single OLS estimation of the following equation using only observations that satisfy v ∈ (200 000 − h; 200 000 + h).
Where 1{v>200 000} is a dummy variable that takes value one if, and only if, the election is carried under DB, u is the error term and the parameters to be estimated are denoted in greek letters. The estimate of γ is the treatment effect and its (heteroskedasticity and cluster-robust) standard error can be obtained in a straightforward manner. The estimation using a quadratic specification is done by just adding two more variables: the square value of v and its interaction with 1{v > 200 000}.
A key decision is h, the kernel bandwidth. Higher (lower) values will generate more (less) precision but create larger (smaller) bias. To show the robustness of the results to different choices of h this paper presents the results for three different levels: 25 000; 50 000, and 75 000. Notice that these are relatively small and hence try to reinforce the "local" intuition of regression discontinuity designs: although there are more than 15 000 observations in the data, less than 200 are used to obtain all of the estimates. 20 To further test robustness, estimates where the limits are approximated with a quadratic instead of linear relationship, were also used.
Results
This section presents the empirical results. As is standard practice in the literature using regression discontinuity designs, a mix of graphical evidence and formal estimates are line is plotted) is where the discontinuity in outcomes, if existent, is expected to be visible.
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There is a clear jump at the cutoff value, while the relationship is smooth elsewhere. This implies that votes for the third or lower placed candidates in the election increase by about 10 p.p. as there is a move from SB to DB. This increase is large when taken into account that the vote share is about 15%-20% to the left of the threshold: DB increases the voting for the third (and lower) candidates by more than 50%.
The formal estimates are provided in the first row of Table 1 . Columns (1)-(3) presents the results for different bandwidths using the local linear regression, while columns (4) and (5) probe the robustness of the result by using a quadratic specification. Throughout the paper, the estimate presented is the treatment effect of changing from SB to DB. In the 21 In some graphics, a quadratic relationship is fitted, while in others a linear one is used. The decision on which one to use is made by simply testing one against the other.
program evaluation jargon, DB is the "treatment" and SB is the "control." To help evaluate the magnitude of the effects, the "single-ballot mean" -the average for municipalities within a 25 000-voter interval below the 200 000-voter threshold -is presented. All standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and hence are robust to serial correlation of unknown form.
The estimated treatment effects are significant at the 5% level and imply a large positive effect (10-15 p.p.) of DB (as opposed to SB) on the votes of third and lower placed candidates. This is consistent with more than half the voters who would vote for the third placed candidate under DB strategically deserting her and voting for the top two candidates under SB. The fact that the results remain positive and significant throughout columns (1)- (5) shows that the result is robust to different bandwidths and specifications. Appendix 2 shows that the estimates above are also robust to the inclusion of several different covariates and also time dummies.
A possible explanation for this result is that DB increases the number of candidates that enter the race, so that the share of votes captured by third and lower placed candidates under this system could be higher by the mechanical reason that there are more candidates to finish third and lower. Previous theoretical research proposed that DB increases the number of candidates entering the race compared to SB (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996, Bordignon and Tabellini, 2008) , with the latter study -and also Wright and Riker (1989) -finding that there is indeed a larger number of candidates under DB than SB.
However, I find only weak evidence that electoral rules affect the entry of candidates in the Brazilian context. Figure 2 plots In order to assess the threats to validity, Figure 2 repeats the exercise of Figure 1 for the turnout rate (total turnout divided by the number of registered voters) and the registration rate (ratio of registered voters to the total population in the municipality). The relationship between these variables and the number of voters is smooth and does not present a jump at the threshold. Hence, the increase in votes for third and lower placed candidates is not likely driven by differences in turnout in SB and DB municipalities, just as there is no evidence that strategic manipulation of the number of registered voters has taken place.
The formal counterpart is provided in the second and third row of Table 1 , where one can see that estimated treatment effects on turnout and registration are numerically small and statistically insignificant.
To further probe the possibility of strategic manipulation, Figure 3 implements an exercise suggested by McCrary (2008) and plots the number of observations contained in each bin of the previous figures. If strategic manipulation has taken place, it would likely reflect in a jump close to the threshold. If, for example, governments in municipalities just below the threshold tried to deter registration in order to avoid switching to DB in the near future, 24 In the 2000 races, it is also possible to determine the education of the third placed candidates. Adding dummies of third-placed candidate education levels does not affect the results significantly either. then the number of municipalities just below the threshold would probably be unusually large compared to the number of municipalities just above. As Figure 3 shows, no such jump is observed and no evidence of strategic manipulation is found.
Tests for Quasi-Random Assignment
The intuition of the identification strategy is that SB and DB systems in elections close to the threshold are assigned "almost randomly", so that municipalities "just below" and "just above" the threshold are similar in all observed and unobserved predetermined characteristics.
Although there is good reason to believe that this is indeed the case, it is important to provide evidence that this intuition holds. Hence, I check if the values of predetermined variables (i.e., variables measured before the electoral rules were assigned) are the same on each side of the 200 000-voter threshold. In other words, I estimate treatment effects where they are expected to be zero. This exercise is analogous to the common practice of testing for randomization in controlled experiments by comparing averages of predetermined variables in the treatment and control group. The formal counterpart is provided in the first row of Table 2 , where we test for the effect of switching from SB to DB on the (pre-determined) results or the previous election.
As expected, no statistically significant result is found. Obviously, estimating the effect of current electoral rule on previous election result requires dropping outcome observations for the latest election in the sample (2004) . In order to show that the insignificant results are not driven by the smaller sample size, the second row of Table 2 repeats the estimate of the first row (i.e., estimates treatment effect on vote share of the third and lower candidates) using the same sample (1996 and 2000 elections), and finds positive and statistically significant results. Table 2 also presents the estimated treatment effects for a host of geographic and economic variables: the municipalities' longitude and latitude (measured in degrees), per capita monthly income (in 2000 reais), income inequality (measured by the Gini index), education (average years of schooling in the population aged 25 or older) and the population share living in a rural area. The source of all these variables is the Brazilian statistical agency (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística).
These variables are available only for the year 2000 (when a Census was carried out).
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I assume that the value of these variables have not changed between 2000 and 2004 and estimate the treatment effect using a sample that includes the elections in the two years, 27 using the exact same procedure of Subsection 4.1.
The estimated treatment effects are always insignificant at the 10% level, independently of the bandwidth or specification (linear and quadratic) used in the estimation. This evidence implies that SB and DB municipalities are similar in several dimensions and strongly supports a valid regression discontinuity design.
Testing Further Predictions of Strategic Voting
The results in Subsection 4.1 make a strong case that there is indeed a causal validity to Duverger's Law in the context analyzed here -SB causes lower voting for third and lower placed candidates when compared to DB. However, it conveys limited information about what are the mechanisms that drives the result. More specifically, it is not clear that it is 26 The previous census occurred in 1991. However several changes in the boundaries of municipalities that took place in the 1991-1994 period make it difficult to match the data from 1991 for municipalities in the sample (that includes elections that happened in 1996, 2000 and 2004) .
27 I also experimented with inputting the 2000 values for the 1996 elections and performing the regressions using the whole sample, but none of the results changed in a significant way.
the strategic voting pattern of avoiding wasted votes that lowers the voting of third placed candidates under DB.
This section tests other predictions of strategic voting -namely, predictions (2) and (3) stated in Section 2. Prediction 2 states that switching from SB to DB generates increased voting for the third-placed and decreased voting for the second and first placed candidate, so that the ratio between votes for the third placed candidate and the second placed one (hence the TS -as in "third to second" -ratio) -and also the ratio between third and first As expected there is a clear jump in the TS ratio at the 200 000 voter threshold, but not for the SF ratio. This is formally presented in Table 3 : a positive and significant effect of changing from SB to DB is found on the TS (and also the TF) ratios, but not on the SF ratio. Again, the results are robust to different bandwidths and specifications.
This result is strongly consistent with the pattern of strategic voting behind Duverger's Law. Under SB the third placed candidate is deserted, to the gain of the first and second placed candidates. The fact that the effect on the margin of votes between the second and first (the SF ratio) is close to zero and insignificant can be seen as a "falsification test": the concentration of votes caused by SB takes only the particular pattern predicted by theory.
Prediction 3, in its turn, indicates that in elections where one candidate is expected to obtain a large majority of the votes, there is little point for a voter to engage in strategic voting. To capture this idea, the sample is split into a "contested" and "uncontested" elections subsamples. The former are those where the winner obtained less than 50% of the votes (in the SB election or on the first round of the DB election), while the latter includes those where the winner obtained a majority.
The 50% mark captures two important features. First, in 'uncontested" elections even if all voters that did not vote for the winner coordinated perfectly and voted for some other candidate, the results of the election would remain unchanged. Second, the "uncontested" election are those were there is no second round (under DB), so that in some sense a change from SB to DB has no "bite" in this group of races. Moreover, the median of the vote share of the most voted candidate is very close to 50%, so that the samples are divided close to evenly.
Of course, the share of votes obtained by the most voted candidate and the outcome variables (e.g., votes for the third and lower placed candidates) are almost mechanically correlated, which could generate possible sample selection biases.
28 In order to show the robustness of the exercise to the issue, Appendix C replicates the estimations dividing the sample by the vote share that is predicted using data from municipal legislature elections occurring simultaneously to the mayoral races. All the qualitative results are the same.
As predicted by strategic voting, Panel A in Table 4 shows that the estimated effect of switching from SB to DB on voting for the third and lower placed candidates and the TS and TF ratios are always positive and generally statistically significant in the "contested" sample (the 25 000 bandwidth sample is likely too small to generate significant results). On the other hand, the estimated effects are close to zero and always insignificant in the "uncontested" elections (Panel B). Moreover, the magnitude of the estimates in the "contested" sample is larger than in the full sample and close to zero in the "uncontested" sample implies that it is the closer races that drive the results of Subsection 4.1.
The importance of the evidence supporting Predictions 2 and 3 cannot be overemphasized. It rules out almost any other alternative explanation for the results and substantially increase confidence that it is indeed strategic voting that drives the Duverger's Law results of Subsection 4.1. For example, one could argue that under DB candidates may adopt different 28 However, it is not clear how this sample bias would operate. Notice also that the effect of a change from SB to DB in the probability of having an election labeled as "contested" was estimated to be insignificantly different from zero.
positions than under SB, affecting the distribution of votes. However, it would be extremely hard for such argument to account for all the particular results found above.
A Falsification Test: Municipal Legislature Elections
The mayoral elections are run simultaneously with the elections for the legislative body of the municipalities (Câmara dos Vereadores) -a voter casts his vote for the municipal legislature at the same time and place that he votes for mayor (in the case of DB municipalities, at the same time of the first round).
Elections for municipal legislature are run under a proportional representation system.
29
As in mayoral elections, a municipality is considered a single district and most importantly, the electoral rules are exactly the same for cities below and above the 200,000 voter threshold.
This allows for a powerful falsification test: given that electoral rules are the same on both sides of the threshold, one should not expect a difference in electoral outcomes.
I estimate the treatment effects on four different electoral outcomes: the share of seats 30 that is awarded to the party of the elected mayor and mayoral elections, the share of seats that are awarded to the most voted (and also the two most voted) parties in the legislature election and the Hirschman-Herfndahl Index (HHI) 31 of concentration in the elected legislature.
The results are presented graphically on Figure 6 . For the four outcomes, there seems to be a smooth relationship with no clear jumps at the 200,000-voter threshold. The formal counterpart can be seen on Table 5 , where the results are mostly close to zero and generally insignificant.
32
These results not only increase confidence in the causal validity and quasi-random nature 29 Specifically, the system used is open-list proportional representation with seats awarded by the d'Hondt formula. This is the proportional representation system where a voter can cast a vote to individual candidates or party lists. The number of seats awarded to a party is proportional to votes that the party list or party candidates received, but the votes for which candidate within a party list define which individual will get the seat. For a discussion of different variations of proportional representation, see Cox (1997) .
30 Given the proportional representation nature of the election, seat shares and vote shares by party are virtually the same.
31 The index equals the sum of the squares of the seat shares of each party. Hence it goes from zero (infinite amount of parties, one with each seat) to one (one party has all the seats). The inverse of this measure is commonly used in the political science literature and is referred to as the "effective number of parties".
32 The significant results appear only in the 25 000 bandwidth sample with linear specification and 50 000 bandwidth sample with quadratic specification, which likely implies that an outlier close to the threshold is driving the result. of the previous evidence, but it also provides the interesting evidence that there is very limited spillovers from voting behavior in the mayoral election to the legislature election, even though they occur simultaneously.
Conclusion
This paper argued that, at least in the context of Brazilian mayoral elections, there is strong evidence that voters act strategically. Single-ballot plurality rule, when compared to dualballot, generates an incentive for voters to desert the candidates that are expected to finish third and lower and switch their vote to the top two contenders. The result is unlikely to be spurious or a statistical artifact because it derives from a regression discontinuity design existent in the allocation of electoral rules in Brazil.
Although the patterns found in the data make a strong case that it is strategic voting, rather than strategic entry or positioning of candidates that drives the results, it says very little about the mechanisms that generate the (perhaps self-fulfilling) expectations of which candidates will finish first, second and third, and how these expectations allow coordination between voters.
In a representative election of the sample used in estimations, over 160 000 citizens vote.
How do such a large number of people coordinate? An useful direction of future research would be to address this question by investigating if it is polls, media coverage, campaign contributions or some other factor that allow coordination to arise.
Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics
See table A1.
Appendix B: Treatment Effects with Controls
As in a randomized experiment, with a regression discontinuity design consistent estimates of the treatment effects can be obtained without including covariates in the estimations.
However, it is common practice to do so for two reasons. First, covariates that are known not to be affected by treatment/control status but are correlated to the outcome variable may increase the precision of the estimates. Second, it provides a robustness check, since the inclusion of the covariates should not affect the size of the estimated treatment effects.
In this section I repeat the main estimation of the paper (presented in the first row of Table 1 ) using different covariates as controls. First, a full set of time dummies is included in all the regressions presented in this appendix. I also add three separate sets of controls.
The first one is the "electoral covariates" set, which include three variables -the number of candidates, the registration rate and the turnout rate -that are describe in Subsection 4.1. The second set is named "economic covariates" and includes the per capita income, average years of schooling, share of population living in a rural area and a measure of income inequality (Gini index) in the municipality -these variables and their sources are described in Subsection 4.2. Finally, there is a "geographical covariates" set that includes the municipality's longitude and latitude (see Subsection 4.2 for details).
The results are presented in Table A2 . A comparison with the first row of Table 1 shows that the estimates' magnitude and significance are robust to a number of different covariates.
The size of the standard errors show, however, that there is not much gain in precision by adding additional controls.
Appendix C: Treatment Effects in Predicted Contested and Uncontested Elections
This appendix repeats the exercise described in Subsection 4.3 and presented in Table 4 .
However, instead of coding elections as "contested" and "uncontested" according to the actual vote share of the most voted candidate, I use vote shares predicted by the outcome of the municipal legislature elections (see Subsection 4.4 for details).
First, I run a regression of the vote share of the first placed mayoral candidate against the vote share of the most voted party in the municipal legislature election. The latter is a strong predictor of the former given that it captures the presence of a popular party in the election. The predicted first placed mayoral candidate vote shares obtained from this regression is then used to generate a "contested elections" (and "uncontested elections") sample, with predicted vote share lower (above) than 50 percent.
By using predicted vote shares instead of the actual ones, I the avoid sample selection issues created by the fact that the first placed candidate vote share is mechanically correlated with the dependent variables of interest. The intuition is that the criterion to separate the samples relies solely on variation in the outcomes of the municipal legislature elections, which are shown in Subsection 4.1 not to be affected by a change from SB to DB.
The results are presented in Table A3 . Comparison with Table 4 show that they are very similar. There are positive and significant results for the contested elections subsample but not for the uncontested elections subsample. Notice that, although the sample sizes in the former are relatively small, this result is mostly driven by the small (or even negative) size of the estimates and not by the larger standard errors.
In conclusion, this exercise increases confidence in the evidence presented in Subsection 4.3. Includes the of candidates with college education as a covariate. Data are for the 2000-2004 races only (the number of observations are 70, 36, and 103 for the 50 000, 25 000 and 75 000 bandwidth samples, respectively). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Each entry in the table is from a separate local linear/quadratic regression using the specified bandwidth. The level of observation is a municipality-election. The estimated treatment effect is of a change from SB to DB. An estimate using bandwidth k uses a sample of elections in municipalities with more than 200 000-k and less than 200 000+k registered voters. Details on the dependent variables are in the text. Single-ballot mean refer to the average value in municipalities with more than 175,000 and less than 200 000 voters. Observations a -82 39 133 82 133 *** -Significant (1% level); **-Significant (5% level); *-Significant (10% level). a The observations for the vote share of third and lower placed candidates (first and second rows) are 70, 36, and 103 for the 50 000, 25 000 and 75 000 bandwidth samples, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Each entry in the table is from a separate local linear/quadratic regression using the specified bandwidth. The level of observation is a municipality-election. The estimated treatment effect is of a change from SB to DB. An estimate using bandwidth k uses a sample of elections in municipalities with more than 200 000-k and less than 200,000+k registered voters. Details on the dependent variables are in the text. Single-ballot mean refer to the average value in municipalities with more than 175 000 and less than 200 000 voters. Observations -114 56 183 114 183 *** -Significant (1% level); **-Significant (5% level); *-Significant (10% level). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Each entry in the table is from a separate local linear/quadratic regression using the specified bandwidth. The level of observation is a municipality-election. The estimated treatment effect is of a change from SB to DB. An estimate using bandwidth k uses a sample of elections in municipalities with more than 200 000-k and less than 200 000+k registered voters. Details on the dependent variables are in the text. Single-ballot mean refer to the average value in municipalities with more than 175 000 and less than 200 000 voters. Observations -43 24 70 43 70 *** -Significant (1% level); **-Significant (5% level); *-Significant (10% level). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Each entry in the table is from a separate local linear/quadratic regression using the specified bandwidth. The level of observation is a municipality-election. The estimated treatment effect is of a change from SB to DB. An estimate using bandwidth k uses a sample of elections in municipalities with more than 200 000-k and less than 200 000+k registered voters. Details on the dependent variables are in the text. Single-ballot mean refer to the average value in municipalities with more than 175 000 and less than 200 000 voters. *** -Significant (1% level); **-Significant (5% level); *-Significant (10% level). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Each entry in the table is from a separate local linear/quadratic regression using the specified bandwidth. The level of observation is a municipality-election. The estimated treatment effect is of a change from SB to DB. An estimate using bandwidth k uses a sample of elections in municipalities with more than 200 000-k and less than 200 000+k registered voters. Details on the dependent variables are in the text. Single-ballot mean refer to the average value in municipalities with more than 175 000 and less than 200 000 voters. 114 183 *** -Significant (1% level); **-Significant (5% level); *-Significant (10% level). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Each entry in the table is from a separate local linear/quadratic regression using the specified bandwidth and including a full set of year dummies. The level of observation is a municipality-election. The estimated treatment effect is of a change from SB to DB. An estimate using bandwidth k uses a sample of elections in municipalities with more than 200 000-k and less than 200 000+k registered voters. The dependent variable is always the vote share obtained by the third and lower placed candidate. The different sets of covariates are described in Appendix B. Single-ballot mean refer to the average value in municipalities with more than 175 000 and less than 200 000 voters. 
